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Phobic individuals display an attention bias to phobia-related information and biased
expectancies regarding the likelihood of being faced with such stimuli. Notably, although
attention and expectancy biases are core features in phobia and anxiety disorders, these
biases have mostly been investigated separately and their causal impact has not been
examined. We hypothesized that these biases might be causally related. Spider phobic
and low spider fearful control participants performed a visual search task in which they
specified whether the deviant animal in a search array was a spider or a bird. Shorter
reaction times (RTs) for spiders than for birds in this task reflect an attention bias toward
spiders. Participants’ expectancies regarding the likelihood of these animals being the
deviant in the search array were manipulated by presenting verbal cues. Phobics were
characterized by a pronounced and persistent attention bias toward spiders; controls
displayed slower RTs for birds than for spiders only when spider cues had been presented.
More important, we found RTs for spider detections to be virtually unaffected by the
expectancy cues in both groups, whereas RTs for bird detections showed a clear
influence of the cues. Our results speak to the possibility that evolution has formed
attentional systems that are specific to the detection of phylogenetically salient stimuli
such as threatening animals; these systems may not be as penetrable to variations in
(experimentally induced) expectancies as those systems that are used for the detection of
non-threatening stimuli. In sum, our findings highlight the relation between expectancies
and attention engagement in general. However, expectancies may play a greater role in
attention engagement in safe environments than in threatening environments.
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INTRODUCTION
The present study investigates the interplay between two impor-
tant known biases in phobic and non-phobic fear 1, namely,
expectancy bias and attention deployment bias. Although both
have been demonstrated to be core features in phobia, to date,
these two phenomena have been investigated independently from
each other (expectancy bias: Davey and Dixon, 1996; de Jong and
Muris, 2002; Mühlberger et al., 2006; Aue and Hoeppli, 2012;
attention bias: Watts et al., 1986; Öhman et al., 2001; Olatunji
et al., 2008; Okon-Singer et al., 2011; see also Bar-Haim et al.,
2007; Cisler and Koster, 2010; Yiend, 2010, for a review).
Individuals with phobia or extreme fear of specific objects or
animals, such as snakes or spiders, exhibit an expectancy bias
when estimating the chances of encountering their feared object
(de Jong andMuris, 2002; Aue and Hoeppli, 2012). Furthermore,
they estimate that once they encounter their feared object, the
circumstances will be more negative compared with their own
estimations for objects that are less feared by them, and compared
1We refer to individuals with extreme fear, but who were not clinically diag-
nosed as phobic, as “fearful.” Phobic individuals in the context of the present
paper refer to individuals who were clinically diagnosed.
with the estimations of non-fearful controls (e.g., Davey and
Dixon, 1996; Mühlberger et al., 2006).
Studies on attention bias showed that fearful or phobic indi-
viduals tend to engage attention more quickly in their feared
stimuli than in unfeared stimuli (e.g., Mogg and Bradley, 2006;
Vrijsen et al., 2009); moreover, these individuals are slow in
disengaging attention from their feared stimuli compared with
unfeared stimuli (e.g., Fox et al., 2001, 2002; Yiend and Mathews,
2001). In addition, fearful or phobic individuals show deficient
ability to ignore fear-related distractors compared with non-
fearful healthy controls (e.g., Gerdes et al., 2008; Okon-Singer
et al., 2011)2. Cisler and Koster (2010) suggested that this early
vigilance to fear-evoking stimuli is followed by later avoidance (cf.
Mogg et al., 1997; Amir et al., 1998; Rinck and Becker, 2006).
2Ameta-analysis (Bar-Haim et al., 2007) revealed that attention bias is consis-
tently found when stimuli are presented outside awareness. This suggests that
the bias for threat-related material in fearful and anxious participants origi-
nates at an early subconscious stage. Yet, part of it may also rely on conscious
processing and top-down influences because larger effect sizes are gener-
ally observed when participants are aware of the presented stimulus material
(Bar-Haim et al., 2007).
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Several studies used a visual search task to explore the factors
modulating engagement of attention (see review in Yiend, 2010).
For neutral items, engagement of attention in certain items pre-
sented in a search array has been shown to be modulated by both
bottom-up factors, such as color or motion, and top-down fac-
tors manipulated via working memory or priming prior to the
search (Wolfe et al., 2003; Burra and Kerzel, 2013; Calleja and
Rich, 2013; Woodman et al., 2013). A potential origin of biases in
attention to threateningmaterial could be biological preparedness
(e.g., Öhman et al., 2001). Such preparedness has been hypoth-
esized to increase bottom-up attentional capture (see Yiend,
2010, for details). Little is known, however, about the impact
of prior expectancies on attention engagement in fear-relevant
targets.
Although quite robust findings have been reported about
expectancy and attention biases in fear and phobia, only a single
study has so far examined their interrelation, to the best of our
knowledge. We (Aue et al., 2013) found evidence that attention
and expectancies might be intimately related in spider phobia.
Viewing time for spiders in spider phobics was positively related
to expectancies for encounters with these animals. Non-fearful
individuals, in contrast, displayed a negative association of view-
ing time and encounter expectancy for spiders. These differential
associations between the two groups were, however, unspecific for
spiders (i.e., held also for snakes and birds), which can possibly
be explained by the generally more stressful nature of the experi-
ment for phobic individuals. Together, these findings suggest that,
in potentially threatening situations, there might be a substantial
difference in the co-organization of attentional and expectancy
processes in phobic and low fearful control participants. Because
the study data are of a correlational nature, we were unable to dis-
tinguish whether variations in expectancies were at the origin of
variations in attention deployment or vice versa.
The current study investigated the directionality of biases
in attention and expectancies and tested whether variations
in expectancies can cause variations in attention deployment.
Despite our earlier focus on visual avoidance (or overall viewing
time; Aue et al., 2013), we were now interested in initial attention
engagement toward threatening stimulus material. Specifically,
we hypothesized that an individual’s expectancies concerning fre-
quencies and consequences of confrontations with threatening
stimuli could sensitize the individual to certain types of stim-
uli. Such a top-down mechanism may then lead the individual
to engage in active search and may guide his or her attention
to evidence in the environment that supports the already exis-
tent expectancies (see Krizan and Windschitl, 2007, as well as
Aue et al., 2012, for related links in between positive cognitive
biases [overoptimism or wishful thinking] and selective atten-
tion). Thus, we hypothesized that prior expectancies about the
occurrence of threatening events would exert a top-down influ-
ence on the visual search for threat (i.e., attention engagement in
threat-related targets).
In order to directly examine the effect of expectancies on atten-
tional engagement, we manipulated expectancies regarding the
likelihood of different types of targets appearing that were pre-
sented in a visual search task. More concretely, spider phobic and
low spider fearful control participants in the present study had to
search for a deviant spider or bird among eight butterflies. Before
the presentation of each search array, a verbal cue informed the
participants about the likelihood that the deviant stimulus would
be a spider or a bird. By this means, we manipulated our par-
ticipants’ expectancies of encountering (i.e., seeing) spiders and
birds.
Three specific hypotheses were tested: First, on the basis of
earlier literature (e.g., Bar-Haim et al., 2007), we predicted the
attention bias for spiders to be more pronounced in spider pho-
bics as compared with the low spider fearful controls. Second,
from the evidence for modulation of detection speed by cueing
and predictability in neutral items arrays (e.g., Wolfe et al., 2003;
Burra and Kerzel, 2013), we predicted an effect of congruency in
that variations in expectancies would modulate detection times
in both groups of participants, with expected deviants leading
to shorter reaction times (RTs). Third, we hypothesized pho-
bic participants to be less sensitive to variations in externally
imposed (or “objective”) expectancies than low spider fearful
controls because of the a priori conviction of the former to incur
an increased risk to encounter (or detect) spiders (e.g., de Jong
and Muris, 2002), even when objective background informa-
tion regarding the likelihood of an encounter is given (Aue and
Hoeppli, 2012).
MATERIALS ANDMETHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Thirty-one participants [16 spider phobic; 8 male (4 in spider
phobic group)], aged between 19 and 46 years (M = 27.1, SD =
6.03) were recruited via ads placed in university buildings and on
university and local websites. These ads looked for participants
who were either extremely fearful of spiders (including strong
physiological response and avoidance), or displayed particularly
low fear of these animals. The study was embedded in a larger
project investigating decision making, psychophysiological, and
central nervous responses while imagining encounters with feared
and non-feared animals. The ads explicitly specified these project
aims. Persons interested in the study were given a telephone inter-
view and screened with the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
of Mental Disorders (4th Edn., Text Rev.; American Psychiatric
Association, 2000) and the International Classification of Diseases
(10th Rev.; World Health Organization, 1992) for criteria for the
presence or absence of spider phobia [adapted from Mühlberger
et al. (2006)].
Apart from meeting or not meeting criteria for spider pho-
bia, fear of spiders was also assessed by asking the participants to
rate their respective fears on a scale from 0 (no fear at all) to 100
(maximal or extreme fear). Spider phobic individuals rated their
fear of spiders much higher than low spider fearful control par-
ticipants did, t(29) = 16.06, p < 0.000001 (Ms = 81.4 and 18.7,
respectively). Fear of spiders was further assessed after the exper-
iment by the use of the French translation of the Fear of Spiders
Questionnaire (Szymanski and O’Donohue, 1995), t(29) = 7.32,
p < 0.000001 (Ms = 86.2 and 24.3).
STIMULI
Search array (attention): Stimuli consisted of (a) 30 pictures dis-
playing spiders, all taken from a recently created picture base
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(Dan-Glauser and Scherer, 2011); (b) 30 birds, collected from the
Internet; and (c) 100 butterflies, also collected from the Internet.
In each trial, the search array consisted of a matrix of nine dif-
ferent animal pictures with three columns and three rows. There
was an equal probability for the spiders and the birds to appear in
any of the nine different locations within the matrix. The stim-
uli were matched for luminance and contrast and displayed in
gray scale.
Cues (expectancy): Three different types of cues were pre-
sented specifying either “spider 90%,” “bird 90%,” or “spider bird
50%” (for half of the participants; for the other half, the latter said
“bird spider 50%”). These cues specified the probability that the
to-be detected deviant in a subsequently presented search array
would be a spider or a bird.
In reality, the spider 90% (bird 90%) cue condition referred
to a probability of 71% (69 trials) that there would actually be
a spider (bird) among eight butterflies in the search array pre-
sented thereafter. In the remaining cases, either a bird (spider)
was presented (23 trials) or no deviant at all (five trials). The lat-
ter trials were included to verify that the participants responded
on the basis of the target perception.
In the 50% cue condition, there was an equal likelihood that
either a spider or a bird would be the deviant in the subsequently
shown search array (46 trials; 23 spider deviants and 23 bird
deviants). In some cases, there was no deviant (five trials).
PROCEDURE
Upon the participants’ arrival at the laboratory, the nature of
the experiment was explained and written informed consent was
obtained (protocol approved by the local ethics committee). The
experimental task was introduced as a test of the capacity to detect
spiders and birds in an array of butterflies. After participants had
thoroughly read the task instructions, they performed 10 practice
trials to become familiar with the task.
Figure 1 shows the sequence of events in an experimental trial.
In each trial, participants saw a fixation cross for 2000–3000ms
that was followed by a cue presented for 1500ms. These cues
referred to the probability that the to-be detected deviant in the
subsequently presented search array would be a spider or a bird
(see preceding section for further details regarding the expectancy
cues). After the presentation of the cue, another fixation cross
appeared for 2000–3000ms. Next, the search array, consisting of
nine pictures [either nine butterflies (no deviant), eight butter-
flies and a spider, or eight butterflies and a bird] was shown for
2500ms. The participants had to decide whether there was no
deviant, or whether the deviant was a spider or a bird.
Participants were instructed to react as fast and correctly as
possible. Responses were given by pressing three different keys on
the computer keyboard; the keys attributed to spiders and birds
were counterbalanced across participants. A total of 244 exper-
imental trials were presented in random order [four runs of 61
trials with short pauses in between; the frequencies of trials of
different kinds (cues, deviants) were comparable between runs].
The next trial began immediately after the detection period had
elapsed. The inter-trial interval was jittered around 9 s.
In a post-experimental questionnaire, the participants speci-
fied whether (a) they had paid attention to the cues; (b) it had
FIGURE 1 | Task sequence. An example of a spider-90% cue [araignée
(French word for spider) 90%] followed by a search array depicting a spider
target. Participants were told that the cues described the likelihood of a
spider or a bird being the deviant in the search array. They were asked to
respond as quickly and accurately as possible according to the target
(i.e., spider, bird, or no target).
been easier for them to detect the spider rather than the bird (and
the reverse question); and (c) there was a greater risk of a spider
rather than a bird being the deviant when the 50% cue had been
presented (and the reverse question).
After the participants had completed the Fear of Spiders
Questionnaire, they were debriefed.
DEPENDENT VARIABLES
The dependent variables consisted of the participants’ RTs for the
correct responses. Errors made up ∼5% of all responses (SD =
3%). We also analyzed differences in expectancies as assessed via
the post-experimental questionnaire (see below for details).
DATA ANALYSIS
Reaction times 3
A 2 × 3 × 2 analysis of variance (ANOVA) with the between-
participants factor group (spider phobic, low spider fearful con-
trol) and the within-participants factors expectancy [spider cue
(spider 90%), bird cue (bird 90%), ambiguous cue (spider
bird 50%/bird spider 50%)], and target (spider, bird) was per-
formed on RTs. Significant effects were further investigated by
the use of post-hoc Tukey tests. An α level of 0.05 (two-tailed)
was applied. All reported effect sizes are partial η2 and simply
noted as η2.
The hypotheses led us to expect first a stronger attention bias
for spiders (i.e., a greater difference in RTs between spiders and
birds) in phobics than in low spider fearful controls, reflected in a
3We also performed analyses on logarithmic RTs and excluded outliers (±3 SD
from individual average RT). However, effects observed in the current study
were not affected by these transformations of the data. Therefore, results for
only the original data will be described.
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significant interaction of the factors group and target. Second, we
anticipated an effect of congruency, with detection of spider tar-
gets being facilitated by spider cues and detection of bird targets
being facilitated by bird cues. Therefore, a significant interaction
of expectancy cue and target was predicted. The third hypothesis
stated that phobic participants would be less susceptible than con-
trol participants to externally induced expectations because of the
strong and comparably persistent tendency to expect encounters
with spiders in the former group (e.g., de Jong and Muris, 2002;
Aue and Hoeppli, 2012). Consequently, we predicted stronger
congruency effects in controls than in phobics, as revealed by a
significant three-way interaction of group, expectancy cue, and
target.
Post-experimental questionnaire
Group differences for the questions in the post-experimental
questionnaire, to which the participants replied with either “yes”
or “no,” were investigated with a χ2 test (df = 1). An α level of
0.05 (two-tailed) was applied.
RESULTS
REACTION TIMES
The 2 (group: spider phobic, low spider fearful control) × 3
(expectancy: spider, bird, ambiguous) × 2 (target: spider, bird)
ANOVA yielded both a significant main effect of expectancy,
F(2, 58) = 17.76, p < 0.000005, η2 = 0.38 (Ms = 1089.2, 1018.4,
and 1041.1ms, for spider, bird, and ambiguous, respectively),
and a significant main effect of target, F(1, 29) = 37.23, p <
0.000005, η2 = 0.56 (Ms = 960.8 and 1138.4ms, for spider and
bird, respectively; see also Figure 2). These effects were quali-
fied by the higher-order interactions described in the following
paragraphs.
In accordance with our first hypothesis, in which we pre-
dicted a stronger attention bias for spiders being present in
phobics compared with controls, the interaction group × tar-
get achieved significance, F(1, 29) = 17.50, p < 0.0005, η2 = 0.38
(phobics:Ms = 924.6 and 1224.0ms, for spider and bird, respec-
tively; controls: Ms = 997.0 and 1052.8ms). Overall, controls
did not display different RTs for the detection of spiders and
birds (Tukey test for this pairwise comparison: p > 0.54), whereas
FIGURE 2 | Reaction times. Error bars depict standard errors.
phobics demonstrated particularly slow RTs for the detection of
birds (compared with RTs for spiders, as well as compared with
RTs for both spiders and birds in the control group; all ps < 0.05).
Consistent with our second hypothesis, in which we pre-
dicted that expectancy cues would facilitate RTs with respect
to congruent targets, the ANOVA revealed a significant inter-
action of expectancy × target, F(2, 58) = 23.24, p < 0.000001,
η2 = 0.44 (spider targets: Ms = 954.1, 947.2, and 981.0ms, for
spider, bird, and ambiguous cue, respectively; bird targets: Ms =
1089.7, 1224.4, and 1101.3ms, for bird, spider, and ambiguous
cue, respectively). Somewhat surprisingly, though, expectancy
effects were limited to the detection of birds; post-hoc Tukey tests
for this interaction showed no difference between spider detec-
tions related to the three expectancy cues (ps > 0.63; all other
ps corresponding to pairwise comparisons for this interaction <
0.0005).
The interaction of group, expectancy, and target,
F(2, 58) = 1.79, p = 0.18, η2 = 0.06, did not reach signifi-
cance. Nevertheless, on the basis of our third a priori hypothesis
that experimentally induced expectancies would modulate detec-
tion times in low spider fearful controls more strongly than in
phobics, we performed analyses separately for phobics and con-
trols. Phobics displayed a significant main effect of expectancy,
F(2, 30) = 9.00, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.37 (Ms = 1117.2, 1038.8, and
1067.0ms, for spider, bird, and ambiguous, respectively), due
to prolonged RTs for spider cues; a significant main effect of
target, F(1, 15) = 36.28, p < 0.00005, η2 = 0.71 (Ms = 924.6 and
1224.0ms, for spider and bird, respectively), due to faster RTs for
spider compared with bird targets; and a significant interaction
of both factors, F(2, 30) = 9.11, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.38 (spider
targets: Ms = 928.8, 912.0, and 933.0ms, for spider, bird, and
ambiguous cue, respectively; bird targets: Ms = 1165.6, 1305.7,
and 1200.8ms, for bird, spider, and ambiguous cue, respectively).
Tukey tests revealed that expectancy cues did not differentially
influence the detection of spiders (ps > 0.93, for the three
corresponding pairwise comparisons)4. By contrast, expectancy
cues clearly influenced the detection of birds in the phobic group,
with spider cues leading to slower detections than both bird cues
and ambiguous cues (ps < 0.001), and no difference between the
latter two (p > 0.61).
Similarly, in the low spider fearful controls, all effects achieved
(or approached) significance: a main effect of expectancy,
F(2, 28) = 9.34, p < 0.0005, η2 = 0.40, again due to slowed RTs
for spider cues (Ms = 1061.2, 998.1, and 1015.4ms, for spi-
der, bird, and ambiguous, respectively); a main effect of target,
F(1, 14) = 5.13, p < 0.07, η2 = 0.22, due to faster RTs for spider
compared with bird targets (Ms = 997.0 and 1052.8ms, for spi-
der and bird, respectively); and an interaction of expectancy ×
target, F(2, 28) = 15.04, p < 0.00005, η2 = 0.52 (spider targets:
Ms = 979.4, 982.5, and 1029.0ms, for spider, bird, and ambigu-
ous cue, respectively; bird targets: Ms = 1013.7, 1143.1, and
1001.7ms, for bird, spider, and ambiguous cue, respectively).
Tukey tests revealed that the detection of birds was slowed
4But detection of spiders was altogether more rapid than detection of birds (all
ps < 0.0005), reflecting a strong and persistent attention bias to fear evoking
compared with neutral information in phobic participants.
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when spider cues had been previously presented (ps < 0.005
with respect to all other conditions); no difference was observed
between the remaining conditions (ps > 0.38). These results
demonstrate that, similar to the results in the phobic group,
experimentally induced expectancies did not impact RTs for
spider deviants in the control group, while they did influence
detection of deviant birds.
Post-experimental questionnaire 5
Most phobic and control participants said they had paid atten-
tion to the cues (phobics: 12 of 14, controls: 10 of 15; no group
difference: χ2 = 1.43, ns), demonstrating that most of our par-
ticipants followed task instructions quite well. In line with the RT
data, showing a stronger attention bias in phobics compared with
controls, most phobics indicated that it had been easier for them
to detect spiders rather than birds (9 of 14), whereas less than a
third of the control participants thought it had been so (4 of 15),
χ2 = 4.14, p < 0.05. Finally, more phobics than controls speci-
fied a greater risk of a spider rather than a bird having been the
deviant when the 50% cue had been presented (phobics: 9 of 14,
controls: 1 of 15), χ2 = 9.96, p < 0.005.
DISCUSSION
First, we had hypothesized that phobic individuals would dis-
play a stronger attention bias than controls [cf. meta-analytic data
reported by Bar-Haim et al. (2007), and a review of the topic in
Okon-Singer et al. (2013)]. Data in the current project are sup-
portive of this hypothesis. We observed a strong and persistent
attention bias for spiders in spider phobics. An attention bias
for spiders existed also in the low spider fearful control group;
however, it was much smaller than in phobics and limited to
specific situational requirements: Prolonged RTs for the detec-
tion of birds rather than spiders in control participants were
observed only when spider expectations had been induced. Such
greater context dependency of the attentional bias in controls
might explain the inconsistency of results regarding the exis-
tence of an attention bias for threatening animals in healthy
individuals (positive findings: e.g., Öhman et al., 2001; Lipp and
Waters, 2007; null findings: e.g., Tipples et al., 2002; Lipp et al.,
2004).
It is noteworthy that, in contrast to Bar-Haim et al.’s (2007)
meta-analytic data, the difference between spider phobic and low
spider fearful control participants in the current study was not so
much based on the particularly rapid RTs of spider phobics for
spiders, but more strongly on the particularly slow RTs of these
participants for birds. It is possible that the phobic participants
did not trust the bird cues, and due to an a priori expectancy bias
(e.g., de Jong and Muris, 2002; Aue and Hoeppli, 2012) that was
independent from our experimental manipulations, expected the
spiders with a higher likelihood than birds. Spider phobics may
have therefore started to selectively and quickly scan the visual
array for spiders in all trials. Such biased stimulus processing may
have impeded attention engagement in birds until it had been
determined that there really were no spiders. Support for such
5As a result of time limitations, two phobic participants did not complete the
post-experimental questionnaire.
an idea comes from the responses of the phobics to the post-
experimental questionnaire, in which they even retrospectively
specified a greater risk of a spider rather than a bird having been
the deviant when the 50% cue had been presented. The fact that
participants were told that spider and bird cues indicated a like-
lihood of 90% for the cued animal to be the deviant target in the
visual search array, but the actual likelihood was only 71%, may
have further increased the distrust in the cues.
Second, we had predicted an effect of congruency in that
variations in the experimentally induced expectancies would
modulate attention engagement in both groups of participants,
with expected deviants leading to a shortening of RTs and unex-
pected deviants leading to a slowing of RTs. Such an effect was
demonstrated earlier for search arrays presenting neutral items
(e.g., Wolfe et al., 2003; Burra and Kerzel, 2013). Burra and
Kerzel (2013), for instance, examined attentional capture dur-
ing a visual search task while varying the predictability of neutral
targets. Their findings show that predictability influenced atten-
tion engagement by modulating the search mode (singleton vs.
feature search). In line with these results, we had predicted that
prior expectancies given by the cues would modulate attention
engagement in the current study.
In a general sense, we were indeed able to show that experi-
mentally induced “objective” expectancies can impact RTs related
to the detection of deviant animals in a visual search array. These
findings hence support the existence of a causal link between
expectancies and attention engagement. However, contrary to our
predictions, this link is not simple: Our ANOVA results suggest
that the experimentally manipulated expectancies did not influ-
ence attention deployment for the detection of spiders in both
the spider phobics and the low spider fearful controls. Yet, repli-
cating earlier results for neutral stimulus material (e.g., Burra
and Kerzel, 2013), the experimentally induced expectancies—
specifically the spider cues—had an impact on the detection of
birds. Thus, the deviant needed to be neutral for an increase in
RTs to be detected in the invalid trials. This pattern of results
suggests that the detection of threatening stimuli relies on differ-
ent mechanisms than those required for the detection of neutral
stimuli.
The modulation of attention capture by cues shown for bird
targets is in line with models of visual detection that emphasize
the role of priming and working memory representations in the
modulation of visual search. For example, according to the atten-
tional engagement theory (Duncan and Humphreys, 1989, 1992),
attentional selection is modulated by templates actively main-
tained in memory. Similarly, the guided search model (Wolfe,
2003, 2010; Wolfe et al., 2003) argues that an a priori map guides
subsequent search behavior. This top-down attention guidance
may be manipulated via explicit task demands, or implicitly via
expected target identity created through priming. Together, these
theories suggest that if a sensory input matches a set of prede-
fined properties, it will lead to involuntary shifts of attention.
The results for birds in our study suggest that our experimental
manipulation of expectancies may have influenced the content
of such an a priori map (i.e., set of predefined properties), but
these manipulations clearly did not affect attention engagement
to threatening information.
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That there was no congruency effect for spider targets in
phobics can be possibly explained by the fact that phobic partic-
ipants are characterized by generally increased a priori expectan-
cies of being presented with images of spiders (e.g., de Jong
and Muris, 2002; Aue and Hoeppli, 2012). The experimentally
induced expectancies in the present study may have influenced
these habitual encounter expectancies only slightly, or even not
at all, thereby being ineffective in producing significant changes
in the habitually increased vigilance for spiders in spider pho-
bics. If this effect were observed in phobics but not in con-
trols, the data would be consistent with our third hypothesis
that stated that phobic participants would be less sensitive than
controls to variations in externally imposed (or “objective”)
expectancies.
Yet, contrary to our predictions, experimentally induced
expectancies did not influence RTs for spiders in controls either,
and these participants are not generally characterized by increased
expectancies of encounters with spiders (Aue and Hoeppli, 2012).
Therefore, our data do not allow the conclusion that an external
induction of expectancies regarding spider encounters is gener-
ally more successful in non-fearful control participants than in
phobic participants. That both groups of participants were able
to follow task instructions and adopt different expectancy states
according to the cues presented, however, is proven by the par-
ticipants’ differentiated responses to birds. Hence, the observed
null finding for an influence of expectancies on spider detection
speaks to specialized attention engagement toward threatening
information.
Diverse kinds of specialized attention engagement in threat-
ening information have been reported before (Öhman et al.,
2001; Notebaert et al., 2011; see review in Yiend, 2010). Öhman
et al. (2001) showed faster detection of threatening animals com-
pared with flowers and mushrooms in non-phobic individuals.
Interestingly, this quicker detection was amplified in phobic indi-
viduals [contrary to the current study, but in line with Bar-Haim
et al.’s (2007), review; for a discussion of these inconsistencies,
see first hypothesis above]6. Because an attention bias was found
for phobic and non-phobic participants, the findings were inter-
preted as a preattentive prioritization of threat information due
to biological preparedness. However, albeit the observation that
detection of fear-relevant animals is prioritized, it has been shown
that the degree of facilitation depends on the number of dis-
tracting items in the search array, thus contradicting the idea of
preattentive processing of threatening stimuli (Batty et al., 2005;
Notebaert et al., 2010, 2011).
Our findings are consistent with the view of a universal (i.e.,
not linked to high levels of fear) evolutionary heritage for the
processing of threat7. This view may explain why the detection
of evolutionary salient stimuli such as threatening animals (here:
spiders) is not as penetrable to experimental expectancy manip-
ulations as the detection of non-threatening stimuli (for similar
findings using a dot-probe task in unselected participants, see
6Note as well that there were significant differences between the experimental
paradigms used in these earlier studies and our own. For instance, the earlier
studies did not use expectancy cues.
7As outlined above, such processing is not necessarily preattentive.
Lipp and Derakshan, 2005). Such an evolutionary mechanism
would be in line with the idea of biological preparedness for
certain classes of stimuli (Seligman, 1971; Öhman and Mineka,
2001) and would ensure quick adaptive behavioral responses
in the service of survival (e.g., Flykt et al., 2012), responses
that can be initiated without requiring adequate expectancy
states.
It has been proposed that fear responses can be rapidly medi-
ated by a network of subcortical structures (the so-called fear
module, including, for instance, the amygdala; Lang et al., 1998;
LeDoux and Phelps, 2000; Davis and Lang, 2003). The amyg-
dala is capable of initiating a defense response via connections
to the hypothalamus and the brainstem, even without con-
scious processing of information regarding a threatening stimu-
lus. Therefore, and because of the persistence of phobias despite
the explicit knowledge that a feared object is not harmful, the
fear module has been proposed to be “impenetrable to con-
scious cognitive control” (Öhman andMineka, 2001, p. 515). The
fear module may hence ensure automatic processing of survival-
relevant stimuli that is independent of explicit (or externally
imposed) expectancies.
However, it is also possible that the spider pictures in our study
popped out due to a common physical characteristic (e.g., curved
line body with eight legs). This could alternatively explain why
spiders were in general detected very fast and why cue manipula-
tion did not affect RT for spider pictures in both groups. Birds
may lack such a pop-out characteristic. As a consequence, our
cues may have affected the detection of birds only. Note, how-
ever, that fast capture of attention by stimuli associated with
threatening animals was previously shown even when visual fea-
tures had been controlled for. Batty et al. (2005) used a visual
search task with conditioned stimuli. Participants with high or
low fear of spiders or snakes detected abstract shapes that had
been paired earlier with either a neutral picture or a picture of
their feared animal. In this study, both high and low fearful partic-
ipants were overall faster at detecting targets that were associated
with negative animals.
In line with the authors’ conclusion that visual features are
not the reason for facilitated capture of attention by threaten-
ing items, we do not think that differences in visual features can
fully explain the effects found in the current study. Two addi-
tional reasons further strengthen our conviction on this issue.
First, the butterfly distracters in our study were selected on the
basis of the assumption that they share significant features with
both spiders and birds (e.g., wings corresponding to birds’ wings;
six legs + two antennas corresponding to the eight legs of spi-
ders). About 75% of the butterflies were displayed from their side,
clearly showing all legs and antennas. All images were displayed
in gray scale, preventing pop-out effects based on color differ-
ences between stimulus categories. Second, if pop-out effects had
been responsible for our effects, controls should have displayed
an overall greater discrepancy of RTs for spiders and birds.
Subsequent studies should test for the existence of an influence
of attentional processes on expectancies, for instance by manipu-
lating vigilance to or avoidance of threat. Deviations in attention
(e.g., selective visual attention) may lead to biased expectancies
about future outcomes because reality is experienced in specific
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or selective ways. Adding eye-tracking and event-related
potentials to the research tool inventory might help to identify
basic mechanisms underlying phobia-related processing biases,
their time course, and their interdependence. Neuroimaging may
further increase knowledge by directly examining the impact of
the suggested subcortical regions (e.g., in the so-called fear mod-
ule; Lang et al., 1998; LeDoux and Phelps, 2000; Öhman and
Mineka, 2001; Davis and Lang, 2003).
It is also important to note that our control group dis-
played particularly low fear of spiders and therefore might be
characterized by specific responding. We cannot rule out that
some of the control participants specifically liked these animals,
because we did not assess independent data on the pleasant-
ness or appeal of the animals in the current study. The ques-
tion of whether participants characterized by “normal” fear of
spiders exhibit the same pattern of response as phobics and
low fearful controls remains to be investigated. Another aspect
that should be examined is whether the effects observed by
us can be reproduced for threatening stimuli other than ani-
mals that have been proven dangerous throughout evolution
(e.g., guns and knives) in order to test the biological prepared-
ness account. Finally, future studies are needed to rule out the
possibility that the differences in RTs we observed in the cur-
rent study are related to motor processes rather than attention
engagement.
In conclusion, both phobics and low spider fearful controls
showed an attention bias and less influence of expectancy cues
in the detection of spiders, in line with the biological prepared-
ness view. However, the attention bias was larger in phobics,
whereas it was restricted to specific expectancy conditions (i.e.,
spider cues, which produced a slowing of the detection of bird
targets) in controls. Taken together, our results highlight the rela-
tion between expectancies and attention engagement in general.
However, the influence of expectancies may be inhibited during
the processing of threatening stimulus material, and expectan-
cies may play a greater role in safe compared with threaten-
ing environments. Thus, at first glance, our data challenge the
hypothesis that expectancy bias is at the origin of attention bias.
Nonetheless, we cannot rule out that our participants exhibited
a priori expectancy biases (leading to a preferential processing of
spider-related targets) and that these biases were too strong to be
overruled by the expectancy cues used in the present study. Future
research should eliminate this possibility before safe conclu-
sions can be drawn. In general, investigating the mutual relations
between expectancy and attention biases may lead to a more com-
prehensive model of processing of threat in health and anxiety
disorders. Notably, although attention and expectancy biases are
core features in phobia and anxiety disorders, these biases were
mostly investigated separately and their causal impact has not
been examined. The current findings add much needed data to
this emerging field of combining different types of bias. Such
an approach may lead to therapeutic approaches that are more
effective than selective targeting of either attention or expectancy
bias.
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